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DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LAW
Family Court, Queens County, holds that posthumous DNA tests on
a decedent'sfrozen blood samples are admissible in a paternitypro-
ceeding where the decedent's blood was already drawn and avail-
able
Statutory classifications that restrict the ability of illegiti-
mate children to prove paternity' are not subject to "strict scru-
tiny."2 Courts, however, may hold these classifications violative
of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
under a less stringent standard of review: whether they are sub-
'Many states impose such a high burden of proof upon illegitimate children
that the difficulty in proving paternity effectively bars such actions. See, e.g., ARuc
CODE ANN. § 28-9-209(d) (Michie 1988) (requiring satisfaction of any of following in
order for child to inherit real or personal property from father: adjudication of pa-
ternity, father's written acknowledgment of paternity, father's consent to his name
appearing on child's birth certificate, mother and father marrying prior to child's
birth, or father's written voluntary promise or court order to support child); CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45a-438(b)(1)-(4) (West 1996) (requiring adjudication, father's
acknowledgment in writing and under oath, or clear and convincing evidence of both
father's written acknowledgment and his openly treating child as own in order for
illegitimate child to inherit equally with father's other children); N.C. GEN. STAT. §
29-19(b)(2) (1984) (stating that father's acknowledgment of child must be in writing
before certifying officer and filed with clerk of superior court for purposes of intes-
tate succession). See generally Charles Nelson Le Ray, Note, Implications of DNA
Technology on Posthumous Paternity Determination: Deciding the Facts When
Daddy Can't Give His Opinion, 35 B.C. L. REV. 747 (1994) (comparing illegitimate
children's burdens of proof under various state statutes to prove paternity). Sup-
porters of statutes requiring higher standards of proof for illegitimate children to
prove paternity argue that such statutes: 1) discourage sexual relations outside of
marriage by causing individuals to consider the unfair treatment their illegitimate
children could encounter; 2) encourage marriages and protect existing families by
preserving the social stigma of illegitimacy; and 3) minimize the danger of spurious
and fraudulent claims by rendering it difficult to prove paternity. Id. at 757-58.
2 In order to determine whether statutory classifications are subject to strict
scrutiny: 1) the classification must be justified by a compelling government interest;
and 2) the means chosen by the state to effectuate its purpose must be necessary
and narrowly tailored to the achievement of that goal. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of
Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 274 (1986).
' "No State shall make or enforce any law which shall ... deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XV, §
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stantially related to a legitimate state interest.4  Illegitimate
4 The Supreme Court formally adopted the "intermediate standard" of review in
Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 460 (1988). Prior to Jeter, the Supreme Court's stan-
dard of review used to analyze statutory classifications based on illegitimacy had
been tremulous. In Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 76 (1968), the Court found that a
statute which denied unacknowledged non-marital children the right to recover for
the wrongful death of their mother violated the guarantee of equal protection. Jus-
tice Douglas' majority opinion, hinting at a test of both rational review and height-
ened scrutiny, stated that "the test ... is whether the line drawn is a rational one ...
[but] we have been extremely sensitive when it comes to basic civil rights and have
not hesitated to strike down an invidious classification even though it had history
and tradition on its side." Id. at 71.
Three years later, however, in Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532 (1971), the Court
upheld an intestate succession provision which subordinated the rights of acknowl-
edged non-marital children to those of other relatives of the parent. Justice Black,
suggesting a minimum rationality review, stated that "[albsent a specific constitu-
tional guarantee, it is for [the] legislature, not the life-tenured judges of this Court,
to select from among possible laws." Id. at 538-39. In Matthews v. Lucas, 427 U.S.
495, 506 (1976), the Court sustained a Social Security Act provision discriminating
against non-marital children, explicitly declining to apply "strict scrutiny."
The tide turned again in the late 1970's when the Supreme Court, in Trimble v.
Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977), struck down an Illinois statute that barred inheritance
by non-marital children from their fathers. Justice Powell addressed the State's in-
terest in the promotion of legitimate family relationships, explaining that "the
Equal Protection Clause requires more than the mere incantation of a proper state
purpose." Id. at 769. He noted that since Labine, "we have expressly considered and
rejected the argument that a State may attempt to influence the actions of men and
women by imposing sanctions on the children born of their illegitimate relation-
ships." Id. The State further justified the legislation upon "the difficulty of proving
paternity and the related danger of spurious claims." Id. at 770. Justice Powell,
however, emphasized that a law relating to illegitimacy must be "carefully tuned to
alternative considerations." Id. at 772. He reasoned that the "[dlifficulties of proving
paternity in some situations do not justify the total statutory disinheritance of ille-
gitimate children whose fathers die intestate." Id.
The heightened scrutiny of Trimble, however, did not last long. In Lall v. Lall,
439 U.S. 259 (1978), the Supreme Court upheld a New York statute forbidding non-
marital children from inheriting from their fathers unless there was a judicial find-
ing of paternity during the father's lifetime. Justice Powell, writing for the majority,
explained that most statutory classifications produce inequitable results, but noted
that the "inquiry under the Equal Protection Clause does not focus on the abstract
'fairness' of a state law, but on whether the statute's relation to the state interests it
is intended to promote is so tenuous that it lacks the rationality contemplated by
the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. at 273. The Court found that the New York law
was substantially related to the important state interests of providing for accurate
and orderly disposition of property at death, in light of the difficult problems of
proving paternity. Id. at 274.
Despite Lalli, and the fluctuating decisions of the Supreme Court in the 1970's,
the Court continued to accord illegitimacy classifications a degree of heightened
scrutiny into the 1980's. In Mills v. Habluetzel, 456 U.S. 91 (1982), the Court struck
down a Texas law that required a paternity suit by an illegitimate child to be
brought before the child was one year old. Justice Rehnquist explained that the
"support opportunity provided by the State to illegitimate children must be more
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children who can establish their father's paternity are entitled to
benefits similar to those of children born in wedlock.5 Many
states, however, hinder the ability of illegitimate children to es-
tablish paternity through the introduction of genetic evidence af-
ter their putative father's death.' Recent advances in DNA tech-
than illusory." Id. at 97. Such a period must be sufficiently long to permit those who
have an interest in bringing such an action on behalf of the child to do so, consider-
ing the difficult personal, family and financial circumstances that surround the
birth of an illegitimate child. Id. A year later, in Pickett v. Brown, 462 U.S. 1 (1983),
the Court struck down a Tennessee law similar to the law in Mills. The Court rea-
soned that the Tennessee law's two year statute of limitations did not guarantee a
sufficient opportunity for illegitimate children to obtain support. Id.
Finally, five years later, in Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456 (1988), a unanimous
Court agreed that an intermediate level of scrutiny was appropriate for illegitimacy
classifications. The Court held that Pennsylvania's six-year statute of limitations for
non-marital children to bring a support action did not "withstand heightened scru-
tiny under the Equal Protection Clause." Id. at 465. Justice O'Connor explained that
"[t]o withstand intermediate scrutiny a statutory classification must be substan-
tially related to an important governmental objective." Id. at 461.Upon a finding of paternity, most states will hold a father responsible for the
economic support of his illegitimate children. Harry D. Krause, Equal Protection for
the Illegitimate, 65 MICH. L. REV. 477, 478 (1967). Depending upon the individual
state's statute, an illegitimate child may also be entitled to intestate succession. Id.
at 479.
Illegitimate children who prove paternity may also qualify for benefits under
state and federal welfare statutes if the father is covered by the legislation. Id. at
480. Federal statutes use varying methods to determine whether an illegitimate
child is entitled to receive certain benefits. See Note, The Rights of Illegitimates
Under Federal Statutes, 76 HARV. L. REV. 337, 339-50 (1962). For example, the So-
cial Security Act requires that courts analyze the applicable state law on intestate
inheritance to determine whether an applicant is the child of an insured individual.
See 42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(2)(A) (1988); see also Timothy G. Barrett, Is Discrimination
Against Illegitimate Children Worthy of Stricter Scrutiny Under the Constitution? -
The Relationship Between State Intestate Succession Statutes and the Social Secu-
rity Act in Claims for Child Benefits for Illegitimate Children, 33 U. OF LOUISVILLE
J. FAM. L. 79, 82-84 (1995). Some federal statutes provide detailed provisions to de-
termine whether an illegitimate child is eligible for benefits. See, e.g., 10 U.S.C. §
1477(b)(5) (1996) (including illegitimate children among eligible survivors for pur-
pose of receiving death gratuity under Armed Forces General Military Law govern-
ing personnel death benefits, where these children "have been acknowledged in
writing signed by decedent; have been judicially determined, before the decedent's
death, to be his children; who have been otherwise proved, by evidence satisfactory
to the Secretary of Veteran's Affairs, to be the children of, decedent; or to whose
support the decedent had been judicially ordered to contribute."); 33 U.S.C. §
902(14) (1994) (defining "child" under Longshoremen and Harbor Worker's Compen-
sation Act to include "acknowledged illegitimate child dependent on the deceased").
a See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 49-14(c) (1994) (stating that no judgment establishing
paternity may be entered after death of putative father); LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art.
919 (West 1952) (requiring both acknowledgment of paternity by father and absence
of any descendants, ascendants, collateral relatives, or wife for illegitimate child to
inherit); cf UNIFOR1 ACT ON PATERNITY § 7 (1960); UNIFORM PARENTAGE ACT § 9
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nology ensure reliable and accurate paternity testing, even after
the putative father's death.7 New York, under section 519(c) of
the Family Court Act ("F.C.A."), requires that a blood genetic
marker test be administered to the putative father before his
death to allow a petitioner to commence or continue a paternity
proceeding.' Recently, however, in Anne R. v. Francis C.,' the
(1973) (providing provisions to prove paternity only when putative father is alive).
7 See Batcheldor v. Boyd, 423 S.E.2d 810, 812 (N.C. Ct. App. 1992) (discussing
feasibility of valid testing, analysis, and reporting comparing DNA obtained from
dead human body and from body of living human); Alexander v. Alexander, 537
N.E.2d 1310, 1311 (Franklin County, Ohio P. Ct. 1988) (explaining that, because ac-
curacy and reliability of modem DNA testing have increased, illegitimate children
should no longer be deprived of ability to prove paternity through introduction of
genetic marker testing evidence).
DNA typing can conclusively establish whether an individual is the biological
father of a child. ANDRE A. MOENSsENS ET AL., SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE IN CIVIL AND
CRIMINAL CASES 933 (4th ed. 1995). In the nuclei of every cell, except mature red
blood cells, the DNA molecule is composed of a double helix formed by two strands
of nucleotide units, one from each parent, which are connected to form a twisted
ladder. Id. at 881-83. DNA typing represents the portion of a person's DNA as ge-
netic codes that may be compared with those of other individuals. Id. at 885. Pater-
nity is then determined by comparing the DNA typing of the child, mother and pu-
tative father. Id. at 933.
DNA is first extracted from blood or other tissues of the mother, child, and pu-
tative father. Id. at 890. Restriction enzymes are then used to cut the DNA into
fragments of various length. MOENSSENS ET AL., supra, at 887-88. Some of the re-
sulting fragments are polymorphic, in that they vary in length between individuals.
Id. at 888. These fragments are then sorted according to length and placed on a cell
of agarose gel, where they are affixed to a nylon membrane. Id. at 892-93. Next,
DNA probes locate polymorphic segments among the DNA fragments on the mem-
brane. Id. at 894-95. Finally, the exposure of this membrane photographic film gen-
erates a pattern of elongated bands known as a DNA fingerprint. Id. at 895.
The matching of these DNA fingerprints is the final step in DNA-based pater-
nity testing. Id. at 933. For example, multi-locus probes, one of a number of match-
ing techniques, compare the number of bands assigned to the putative father with
those of the child. Id. Where half of the child's bands match the mother's and the
other half matches the father's, the putative father's relationship to the child is es-
tablished, since all possibilities except the biological parent will be excluded. Id.
Where posthumous actions to prove paternity are permitted, the burden of proof
varies greatly among the states. A number of states require proof by a preponderance
of the evidence. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 508(2)(b) (1987). Other states require
proof by clear and convincing evidence. See ALASKA STAT. § 13.11.045(2)(B) (Michie
1985). Still other states require even a higher burden of proof. See IOWA CODE ANN. §
633.222 (West 1994) (requiring general, notorious, or written acknowledgment of pa-
ternity during putative father's lifetime).
8 N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 519(c) (McKinney Supp. 1996). The legislative intent of
requiring a blood genetic marker test to be administered prior to the putative fa-
ther's death was to discourage fraudulent claims. See Comm'r of Social Serv. v. Wil-
liam C., 147 Misc. 2d 974, 978, 559 N.Y.S.2d 88, 91 (Fam. Ct. N.Y. County 1990).
Several statutes in New York provide for the admissibility of DNA testing in pater-
nity proceedings. See N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 418(a) (McKinney 1983 & Supp. 1996);
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Queens Family Court held that post-death DNA tests on a dece-
dent's frozen blood samples were reasonable and admissible in a
paternity proceeding where the decedent's blood was drawn and
available prior to his death. °
On October 29, 1982, Anne R., an unmarried woman, gave
birth to Megan R." Ten years later, Anne R. filed a petition
which alleged that Francis C., then deceased, was the father of
Megan R. and requested the entry of a posthumous order of
filiation.' Petitioner further requested that the court order ge-
netic marker tests on Francis C.'s frozen blood samples. 3
At the paternity trial, Mrs. C., the decedent's widow, con-
tended that the results of the court-ordered DNA tests were in-
admissible because they were conducted after the putative fa-
ther's death." Mrs. C. relied on In re Sidney Janis,5 where the
court held that a non-marital child was not entitled to exhume a
decedent's body and conduct DNA tests to prove a decedent's pa-
ternity for the purpose of conducting DNA testing to prove dece-
dent was her father in order to establish standing to contest the
admission of a will into probate under section 4-1.2(a)(2)(D) of
the New York Estate Powers and Trusts Law ("EPTL"). 16 In
N.Y. FAMI. CT. ACT § 532(a) (McKinney 1983 & Supp. 1996); N.Y. CIV. PRAc. L. & R.
§ 4518(e) (McKinney 1992 & Supp. 1996).
9 167 Misc. 2d 343, 634 N.Y.S.2d 339 (Fain. Ct. Queens County 1995).
'0 Id. at 347, 634 N.Y.S.2d at 341.
" Id. at 344, 634 N.Y.S.2d at 340.
'Id. at 344, 634 N.Y.S.2d at 340. Determining that the decedent's widow would
be in best position to contest the petitioner's claim, the court ordered the action to
be brought against Mrs. C. See Henry v. Rodd, 95 Misc. 2d 996, 998, 408 N.Y.S.2d
745, 747 (Faro. Ct. Queens County 1978) (explaining that paternity action against
decedent must be directed to personal representative of decedent); cf. Voss v. Duer-
scherl, 425 N.W.2d 828, 831 (Minn. 1988) (holding that underlying paternity action
did not survive putative father's death due to lack of any personal representative for
deceased's estate).
"Anne R., 167 Misc. 2d at 344, 634 N.Y.S.2d at 340. Since Francis C. was the
victim of a homicide, the Suffolk County Medical Examiner's Office had drawn and fro-
zen blood samples from him. Id. at 344, 634 N.Y.S.2d at 340. It is interesting to note
that Mrs. C. did not initially oppose a court order permitting DNA testing because
the results could have excluded the decedent. Id. at 346, 634 N.Y.S.2d 341.
1 Id. at 347, 634 N.Y.S.2d at 341.
s 157 Misc. 2d 999, 600 N.Y.S.2d 416 (Sur. Ct. N.Y. County 1993), affd, 210
A.D.2d 101, 620 N.Y.S.2d 342 (1st Dep't 1994).
16 A non-marital child is a legitimate child for the purposes of inheritance if "a
blood genetic marker test had been administered to the father which together with
other evidence establishes paternity by clear and convincing evidence." N.Y. EST.
POWERS & TRUSTS § 4-1.2(a)(2)(D) (McKinney Supp. 1996) (emphasis added). In
contrast to § 519(c) of the F.C.A., for the purposes of inheritance the EPTL does not
expressly require that the blood genetic marker test be performed prior to the puta-
1996]
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Janis, Surrogate Roth reasoned that section 4-1.2(a)(2)(D) must
be construed consistently with section 519(c) of the F.C.A., 7
which explicitly provides that a paternity proceeding may be
commenced where "a blood genetic marker test had been admin-
istered to the putative father prior to his death."8
The Queens Family Court distinguished the Janis case, ex-
plaining that the petitioner in Anne R., at a separate hearing,
had already established standing to bring the paternity action 9
by presenting evidence that the decedent had "openly and noto-
riously acknowledged the child as his own." ° At the hearing, a
priest testified that at Megan's baptism the decedent introduced
himself as Megan's father and stood where the father tradi-
tionally stands during the ceremony.2' In addition, the petitioner
established that the decedent attended Megan's First Holy
Communion.22 Although the court deemed this evidence suffi-
cient to establish petitioner's standing, the court held that such
meager testimony did not rise to the level of proving paternity by
"clear, convincing and satisfactory proof' and that "paternity was
not established to the point of entire satisfaction."23
The question of whether DNA testing should be permitted
on a decedent's frozen blood samples to determine paternity was
an issue of first impression in New York.24 In ordering the DNA
blood tests, Judge Fitzmaurice noted that section 532 of the
F.C.A.,25 which addresses the question of the admissibility of
tive father's death.
17 In re Sidney Janis, 157 Misc. 2d at 1001-03, 600 N.Y.S.2d at 418-19. Surro-
gate Roth explained that it was unlikely that the legislature would make provisions
for paternity proceedings in the Surrogate Court inconsistent with similar proceed-
ings in the Family Court. Id., 600 N.Y.S.2d at 418.
18 N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 519(c) (McKinney Supp. 1996).
19 Anne R., 167 Misc. 2d at 347, 634 N.Y.S.2d at 341. Judge Fitzmaurice ex-
plained that since Family Court is a statutory court and its powers are limited to
those specifically granted by statute, the court could not, pursuant to § 519(c) of the
F.C.A., order a post-death DNA test to give petitioner standing to commence the pa-
ternity proceeding. Id. at 345, 634 N.Y.S.2d at 340 (citing Corbett v. Corbett, 100
Misc. 2d 270, 418 N.Y.S.2d 981 (Fain. Ct. Queens County 1979)).
20 N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT. § 519(d) (McKinney Supp. 1996).
21 Anne R., 167 Misc. 2d at 345-46, 634 N.Y.S.2d at 340.
Id. at 346, 634 N.Y.S.2d at 340.
2Id. at 346, 634 N.Y.S.2d at 340-41. In New York, paternity must be estab-
lished by "clear, convincing and entirely satisfactory evidence." Janet K. v. Joseph
M., 89 A.D.2d 870, 870, 453 N.Y.S.2d 238, 239 (2d Dep't 1982).
24 Anne R., 167 Misc. 2d at 346, 634 N.Y.S.2d at 341.
' "The results of any such blood genetic marker or DNA test may be received in
evidence..." N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 532(a) (McKinney 1983 & Supp. 1996) (emphasis
[Vol.70:361
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blood genetic marker tests in paternity proceedings, did not ex-
pressly prohibit the admission of post-death blood results into
evidence. 6 Further, she reasoned that the Janis court left the
issue of post-death testing under more reasonable circumstances
open.27 Consequently, Judge Fitzmaurice concluded that in the
present case, where the decedent's blood was already drawn and
available, the ordering of DNA testing was reasonable.28
It is submitted that Anne R. was decided correctly in accor-
dance with equal protection and equal rights for illegitimate
children. There is no longer any rational basis for limiting the
right of illegitimate children to use posthumous DNA blood tests
as evidence to establish paternity.2 9 The United States Supreme
Court has stated that a state's interest in protecting family rela-
tionships is not effectuated by a statute minimizing the rights of
illegitimate children." Additionally, protection of the traditional
added).
26 Anne R., 167 Misc. 2d at 347, 634 N.Y.S.2d at 341. Because this was the first
time in New York State that an order for DNA testing of a decedent's frozen blood
sample had been issued, it took many months for Roche Biomedical Laboratories to
coordinate the drawing, transportation and analysis of the parties' blood samples.
Id. at 346, 634 N.Y.S.2d at 341. The results of the DNA tests indicated the probabil-
ity of paternity to be 96.61%. Id., 634 N.Y.S.2d at 341. In New York, a test result of
95% probability creates a rebuttable presumption of paternity. N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT §
532(a) (McKinney 1983 & Supp. 1996).
2 Anne R., 167 Misc. 2d at 347, 634 N.Y.S.2d at 341. The Appellate Division,
First Department, affirming Janis, stated that "[elven if [EPTL 4-1.2(a)(2)(D)] did
contemplate post-death testing, the request for exhumation was unreasonable as a
matter of law." In re Sidney Janis, 210 A.D.2d at 101, 620 N.Y.S.2d at 343 (emphasis
added).
Anne R., 167 Misc. 2d at 347, 634 N.Y.S.2d at 341.
See generally Le Ray, supra note 1 (discussing that accuracy and advances in
DNA testing, and increased protection for illegitimate children eliminate justifica-
tions for refusing posthumous testing).
3" Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175 (1972) (holding that
Louisiana's worknen's compensation law, which denied equal recovery rights to il-
legitimate children, violated Equal Protection Clause of Fourteenth Amendment).
The Court stated:
The status of illegitimacy has expressed through the ages society's con-
demnation of irresponsible liaisons beyond the bonds of marriage. But vis-
iting this condemnation on the head of an infant is illogical and unjust.
Moreover, imposing disabilities on the illegitimate child is contrary to the
basic concept of our system that legal burdens should bear some relation-
ship to individual responsibility or wrongdoing. Obviously, no child is re-
sponsible for his birth and penalizing the illegitimate child is an ineffec-
tual-as well as unjust-way of deterring the parent.
Id.; see also Trimble, 430 U.S. at 769-70 (explaining that penalizing illegitimate
children cannot affect parents' conduct nor change their own status). But see supra
note 1 (discussing justifications for higher standards of proof and restrictions on il-
1996]
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family structure by preserving the father's wealth and sparing
his wife from recognizing the illegitimate children of her hus-
band also fails as a justification for limiting the rights of ille-
gitimate children in a modern society where divorce, alimony,
remarriage, and stepchildren are common.31 Furthermore, and
most importantly, the accuracy of DNA technology has dimin-
ished fears of inadequate proof and fraudulent claims.32 DNA
testing after the putative father's death can accurately establish
paternity since DNA testing utilizes molecules that remain sta-
ble and testable long after the donor's death.3
In a case factually similar to Anne R., In re Estate of Green-
wood,34 the Superior Court of Pennsylvania ordered the release of
blood samples taken from a deceased putative father for the pur-
pose of performing posthumous genetic testing to determine pa-
ternity.35 The court, interpreting a Pennsylvania statute which
legitimate children to prove paternity).
31 See Krause, supra note 5, at 492-94 (explaining that traditional family struc-
ture is vanishing in society where second marriages, alimony to previous wives, and
stepchildren being counted as members of family unit is increasingly common).
32 Le Ray, supra note 1, at 784; see also MOENSSENS ET AL., supra note 7, at 933-
35 (explaining that DNA typing can establish parentage of biological father to prob-
ability of 99 to 99.75 percent in majority of cases).
' MOENSSENS ET AL., supra note 7, at 935 ("DNA molecule is much more stable
than other genetic markers."); see also Steven Connor & Michael Sheridan, British
Scientist Ends the Long Search for Josef Mengele, THE INDEPENDENT (London), Apr.
5, 1992, at 10 (explaining that DNA test identified man who died and was buried in
1979 as Waffen-SS officer Josef Mengele); Nigel Hawkes, DNA Test Identifies Tsa-
rina's Bones, TIMES (London), Dec. 11, 1992, at Home News Section (explaining that
DNA tests identified bodies unearthed in Russia as members of Russian imperial
family executed by Bolsheviks in 1918).
Many courts, including the New York Court of Appeals, have recognized the va-
lidity of DNA tests to prove the identity of an illegitimate child's father. See People
v. Wesley, 83 N.Y.2d 417, 633 N.E.2d 451, 611 N.Y.S.2d 97 (1994) (recognizing DNA
profiling as generally accepted by relevant scientific community). Courts should no
longer be concerned that the decedent cannot be present to defend himself. See In re
Erbe, 457 N.W.2d 867, 872 (S.D. 1990) (Wuest, C.J., dissenting) ("The accuracy and
infallibility of the DNA test are nothing short of remarkable." (quoting Alexander v.
Alexander, 537 N.E.2d 1310, 1314 (P. Ct. Ohio 1988))). Society, through legislation,
must keep pace with the extraordinary developments in DNA testing. Id.
587 A.2d 749 (Pa. Super. Ct.), appeal denied, 600 A.2d 953 (Pa. 1991).
3" In re Greenwood, 587 A.2d at 757. In Greenwood, the plaintiff notified the de-
ceased's estate that she intended to claim an intestate share of tile estate as the de-
ceased's illegitimate daughter. Id. at 750. The administratrix, wife of the deceased,
refused to accept a birth certificate and affidavits from the decedent's family and
friends attesting to the decedent's acknowledgment that he was the plaintiffs fa-
ther. Id. The administratrix indicated that blood testing was the only evidence of
paternity she was prepared to accept. Id. When the plaintiff discovered that the
county coroner had blood and tissue samples of the decedent, the administratrix re-
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provides that paternity may be proven by clear and convincing
evidence "that the man was the father of the child,"38 concluded
that the use of the past tense was indicative of the legislature's
intent to permit paternity to be established "after" the putative
father's death." The court reasoned that prior judicial concern
that the accurate, efficient, and final disposition of decedent's
property would be jeopardized by problems of proof in posthu-
mous paternity claims, was considerably reduced with the ad-
vent of sophisticated blood and tissue matching procedures." In
addition, the court concluded that the admission of posthumous
genetic blood testing was one way of furthering the public policy
fused to authorize the release of the samples to test for parentage. Greenwood, 587
A.2d at 750. After oral arguments, the Orphans' Court ordered the administratrix to
authorize the release of the decedent's blood for genetic testing. Id. On appeal to the
Superior Court, the administratrix argued that the plaintiff, having reached the age
of 18, was barred from demanding testing of the decedent's blood by an 18-year
statute of limitations. Id. at 752. The court held that there was no statute of limita-
tions for bringing a posthumous paternity action to determine rights of inheritance.
Id.; cf. In re Estate of Smith, No. 84, 385, 84, 386, 1995 WL 689549, at *3 (Fla., Nov.
22, 1995) (rejecting Greenwood rationale with respect to statute of limitations).
:" 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2107(c)(3) (Supp. 1996) (emphasis added).
37 Greenwood, 587 A-2d at 751-52. The use of the past tense ("was") rather than
the present tense ("is") in § 2107 disclosed a legislative intent to authorize a court to
enter an order of posthumous paternity. Id. at 752 n.3; accord Wawrykow v. Si-
monich, 652 A.2d 843, 845 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994).
Greenwood, 587 A.2d at 755 (citing Nichols v. Horn, 525 A.2d 1242, 1245 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1987)). The court acknowledged that Human Leucocyte Antigen (HLA)
blood grouping tests can establish as high as 99.99% probability that the person
tested is the biological father of the illegitimate child. Id; see also Wawrykow, 652
A.2d at 845 (explaining that where decedent's blood sample is available for testing,
and testing might conclusively eliminate him as father or be used as some evidence
of paternity, it is "relevant" factor which should not be withheld). But see Le Fevre
v. Sullivan, 785 F. Supp. 1402, 1407 (C.D. Cal. 1991) (holding that results of DNA
blood testing prior to putative father's death, absent finding that putative father
openly acknowledged paternity, are insufficient to establish parent-child relation-
ship under Social Security Act).
One way for an illegitimate child to establish entitlement to benefits under the
Social Security Act is to prove entitlement to inherit from the insured under the
laws of the state of the insured's domicile. Id. at 1404 n.1. Under California law, a
right to intestate succession depends upon the existence of a proven parent-child
relationship. CAL PROB. CODE § 6408 (West 1991), superseded by §§ 6450-55 (West
Supp. 1995). This relationship can be established by a presumption of paternity at
law that is not rebutted or by seeking a declaration of paternity through a civil ac-
tion. Le Fevre, 785 F. Supp. at 1405-06. Under California law, there is no express
provision for the use of DNA testing to preemptively establish paternity. Id. at
1406-07. But see N.C. GEN. STAT. § 49-14 (1994) (stating that proof of paternity
brought after death of putative father shall not be established without evidence
from blood or genetic marker test).
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of eliminating the stigma of illegitimacy.39
The validity of posthumous genetic testing to prove pater-
nity was reaffirmed when the North Carolina Court of Appeals,
in Batcheldor v. Boyd,4" upheld an exhumation order for the pur-
poses of DNA testing.4' The appellate court concluded that DNA
testing to determine paternity was a reliable procedure under
North Carolina law and should be utilized even when the puta-
tive father is deceased.42 The court accepted the trial court's
finding that the just and orderly disposition of a decedent's prop-
erty constituted a legitimate state interest which outweighed the
importance of the proper respect for the dead.43 Finally, the
court concluded that the possibility of fraudulent or meritless
claims should not deter the court from its search for the truth
when there is sufficient evidence to indicate that paternity ex-
ists."
'9 Greenwood, 587 A.2d at 755-56. The court was distressed by the fact that the
administratrix conceded the value of the blood tests, yet sought to withhold the
admission of such tests to avoid the plaintiff establishing "convincing" proof of pa-
ternity. Id. The court concluded that public policy counseled against allowing such
behavior. Id. at 756.
40 423 S.E.2d 810 (N.C. Ct. App. 1992), review denied, 426 S.E.2d 700 (N.C.
1993).
41 Id. at 814. In Batcheldor, the defendant filed a complaint stating that he in-
tended to bring a declaratory judgment action to determine his inheritance rights.
Id. at 811. Plaintiffs, alleged heirs of the deceased, responded by commencing a de-
claratory judgment action, seeking a determination of whether the defendant was
the son of the deceased. Id. The defendant countered by filing a motion to exhume
the deceased's body for DNA testing. Id. After an extensive hearing, the trial court
ordered the exhumation and subsequent DNA testing. Batcheldor, 423 S.E.2d at
812. Plaintiffs obtained a stay of the exhumation order and appealed the trial court's
decision to the Court of Appeals. Id. at 812-13; cf. Wawrykow, 652 A.2d at 847
(discussing that probate judge, acting in interests of justice, can order exhumation if
petitioner presents sufficient evidence of paternity so that probate judge believes
exhumation and DNA testing would resolve issue of heirship); Alexander, 537
N.E.2d at 1314 (upholding court order for exhumation of putative father so that
DNA testing could be performed). But see supra note 17 and accompanying text for a
discussion of In re Sidney Janis, where Surrogate Roth held that a non-marital child
was not entitled to exhume decedent's body and conduct DNA testing to prove dece-
dent was her father and establish standing to contest admission of a will into pro-
bate under § 4-1.2(a)(2)(D) of the EPTL.
42 Batcheldor, 423 S.E.2d at 813; see also Alexander, 537 N.E.2d at 1314
("Science has developed a means to irrefutably prove the identity of an illegitimate
child's father. No longer are we dependent upon fallible testimony, nor are we con-
cerned that the decedent cannot be present to defend himself. The accuracy and in-
fallibility of the DNA test are nothing short of remarkable.").
Batcheldor, 423 S.E.2d at 812.
4Id. at 814.
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It is asserted that the language of section 519(c) of the
F.C.A., which denies illegitimate children the opportunity to use
posthumous DNA tests as evidence to establish paternity, should
be considered violative of the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. The accuracy, reliability, and advances
in DNA technology justify an order to test a deceased putative
father's genetic material, through exhumation or other available
sources.45 Accordingly, it is submitted that the New York legisla-
ture should amend sections 519(c) and 532 of the F.C.A. to spe-
cifically grant authority to conduct posthumous DNA tests on the
motion of any party or the court.46 Until such statutory authority
is granted, courts should utilize the holding and rationale of
Anne R. to permit posthumous DNA testing to determine pater-
nity. It is further submitted that the legislature should review
all relevant provisions of post-death paternity proceedings, in-
cluding section 4-1.2(a)(2) of the EPTL, to avoid the possibility of
future conflicting judicial responses as in Anne R. and Sidney
Janis.
Charlie John Gambino
Id. at 813-14 (exhumation); Anne R. v. Estate of Francis C., 167 Misc. 2d 343,
347, 634 N.Y.S.2d 339, 341 (Fain. Ct. Queens County 1995) (coroner's blood sam-
ples); Alexander, 537 N.E.2d at 1314 (exhumation); Greenwood, 587 A.2d at 757
(coroner's blood and tissue samples).
'0 By liberalizing the statutes the legislature could detail specific parameters
and circumstances under which the moving party could prevail. See Anne R., 167
Misc. 2d at 350, 634 N.Y.S.2d at 343 (positing that such parameters could include
whether petitioner has standing and whether order is practicable and not unreason-
able); cf Wawrykow, 652 A.2d at 847 (holding that movant must establish
"reasonable cause" as well as "good possibility" that exhumation will provide suffi-
cient blood and/or tissue samples for testing to be entitled to exhumation for pur-
pose of conducting DNA testing).
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